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BEAUTY AND THE LABOUR MARKET
ABSTRACT
We develop a theory of sorting across occupations based on looks and derive its
implications for testing for the source of earnings differentials related to looks. These
differentials are examined using the 1977 Quality of Employment, the 1971 Quality of
American Life, and the 1981 Canadian Quality of Life surveys, all of which contain
interviewers' ratings of the respondents' physical appearance. Holding constant demographic
and labor-market characteristics, plain people earn less than people of average looks, who
earn less than the good-looking. The penalty for plainness is 5 to 10 percent, slightly larger
than the premium for beauty. The effects are slightly larger for men than women; but
unattractive women are less likely than others to participate in the labor force and are more
likely to be married to men with unexpectedly low human capital. Better-looking people sort
into occupations where beauty is likely to be more productive; but the impact of individuals'
looks on their earnings is mostly independent of occupation.
Daniel S. Hamermesh Jeff E. Biddle
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of Texas Michigan State University
Austin, TX 78712 East Lansing, MI 48824
and NBERHe [Aristotle] used to say that personal beauty was a better
introduction than any letter. Diogenes Laertius, The Lives
and Opinions of the Eminent Philosophers (Ca. 200 A.D.)
I. Introduction
Discrimination in the labor market has generated immense amounts
of research by economists. Many alternative theoretical analyses of the nature
of discrimination and a vast empirical literature have been produced. (See,
e.g., Cain's, 1986, review.) In the U.S. alone careful empiricalstudies of
possibly discriminatory outcomes involving blacks, Hispanics, women,
linguistic minorities, physically handicapped workers and no doubt others have
been produced.' Our purpose here is to offer the first study of the economics
of discrimination in the labor market against yet another group —— — theugly
—— — andits obverse, possible favoritism for the beautiful. We examine
whether there is a reduced —formcombination of attitudes toward beauty and
a distribution of workers among jobs that generates apparently discriminatory
labor —market outcomes.
This analysis is interesting in its own right. Every worker brings
some physical attractiveness to the labor market along with other attributes,
and most are concerned, perhaps inordinately so (Wolf, 1991), with this aspect
of their labor—market characteristics.Interest in "lookism, ...the
construction of a standard of beauty/attractiveness," is an expression of a belief
that people failing to meet that standard are mistreated. Antidiscrimination
legislation has been proposed elsewhere to prevent denying employment on the
basis of "facial features, build and height;" and in the U.S. a case law in this
area is developing and likely to burgeon under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990.2
Studying possible discrimination on the basis of looks should also be
of broader interest.It is very difficult to construct a research design that
allows one to distinguish labor —marketoutcomes arising from discrimination
1against a group from those produced by intergroup differences in unobserved
(by the researcher) productivity. In the case of looks we may have a better
chance of doing so, for we can identi1' activities in which looks are likely to
be more important, and thus where the payoff to beauty (or penalty for
homeliness) reflects differences in productivity.In the literature on
discrimination this provides a rare example of going measurement of the extent
of discrimination to examining its sources (but see also Dillingham et al,
1994).
In Section II we examine some relevant results of social —
psychologicalstudies of beauty and human behavior, aiming toward
considering whether it is possible to use measures of beauty as if they were
objective descriptions. Section III presents a model in which beauty is
rewarded in the labor market and affects workers' choice of occupations.
Section IV describes the three sets of microeconomic data that we use to
analyze the role of looks. Section V tests for the presence of earnings
differentials based on looks; Section VI examines possible causes for male—
female differences in the effects of beauty; and Section VII conducts tests
aimed at distinguishing the sources of wage differences by looks.
II. Background
If there is no common agreement on what constitutes beauty, it makes
no sense to consider the role of looks in the labor market. Fortunately, a huge
literature exists on this subject, including research by anthropologists,
sociologists and social psychologists, that has recently been ably summarized
(Hatfield and Sprecher, 1986).It seems quite clear that there are few
consistent standards of beauty across cultures. Hugely distended lower lips are
considered attractive by Ubangi men; women's bound feet by Manchu dynasty
men; and other less extreme examples of differences in standards of beauty
across cultures could easily be cited.
2What is perhaps a bit less obvious is that standards of beauty change
over time within the same culture, changes that go beyond preferences and
fads in clothing to the question of body type. The Rubens ideal looks much
different from her Northern European counterpart walking down the runway
at a modern Paris salon. Today's ideal lean Western male would have been
viewed as potentially or actually consumptive and a bad match in both
marriage and labor markets in nineteenth —centuiy America. The crucial issue
for our purposes is whether standards of attractiveness change slowly enough
to allow labor—market decisions related to beauty to be planned for a horizon
as long as a person's expected working life.
The evidence seems quite clear on this issue: Within a culture at a
point in time there is tremendous agreement on standards of beauty, and these
standards change quite slowly. For example, respondents ranging in age from
seven to fifty who were asked to rank the appearance of people depicted in
photographs showed very high correlations in their rankings. Moreover, the
ratings of the appearances of a group of individuals photographed at different
stages of their adult lives were highly autocorrelated (Hatfield and Sprecher,
1986, pp. 282—3).
Some explicit evidence on this is provided by the tabulations in Table
1.This Canadian survey was conducted in 1977, 1979 and 1981, with
different interviewers in each year asked to "categorize the respondent's
physical appearance" into one of the five rubrics: Strikingly handsome or
beautiful; above average for age (good looking); average for age; below
average for age (quite plain); and homely. The data have some aspects of a
panel, so that many of the respondents were interviewed in two adjacent years,
and some appear in all three years.
The two —year transition matrices in the upper part of Table 1 are
highly nonrandom, as shown by the X2—statistics based on the contingency
tables implicit in them. In each there is much more clustering along the prime
3diagonal than would arise randomly. Thelower part of Table 1 provides
information on the constancy of the interviewers' ratings overthree biennia.
Nearly 93 percent of the respondents are rated identicallyin at least two years
and only one rating level different in the third year.3 Thesedata suggest that
there is substantial positive correlation in how people rate others'looks.
There has been some examination by non—economists of some of the
empirical labor—market correlates of beauty. The bestof these is probably
Quinn (1978), who generated simple correlations ofinterviewers' ratings of
the looks of respondents who were full —time employees withtheir incomes
using one of the data sets we employ. Incomes were higher amongboth men
and women the higher was the assessment of the respondent's looks, based on
a three —point rating of beauty. The resultsheld for both genders, and there
was no evidence of asymmetry in the effect on incomeof departures from the
middle category. A similar study (Roszell 1989)used the Canadian data
underlying Table 1 to regress 1981 income on 1979 incomeand a variable
rating the respondent's looks, with results implyingfaster income growth
among better—looking respondents.
Several studies have examined correlations of earnings with the
appearance of workers in a narrow age and/or occupationalcohort. A recent
good example is Frieze et al (1991), who studied earnings of MBAs overthe
first ten post —degree years. Ratings of beauty based on photographs of the
students while in school were correlated positively with both starting and
subsequent salaries for males. Among females there was nocorrelation with
starting salary, but more attractive women experienced more rapid salary
growth.4
A related larger literature has offered hypothetical résumés of
potential workers along with photographs and asked experimental subjectsto
choose among these workers for various jobs (Hatfield and Sprecher, 1986).
Among men beauty enhanced the worker's likelihood of beingchosen for both
4clerical and professional/managerial jobs. Beauty helped the women's chances
of being selected only for the higher—level clerical jobs.
We can be fairly sure that within modem Western society standards
of beauty are both commonly agreed upon and stable over one's working life.
The evidence also suggests that women's and men's beauty/ugliness might be
treated differently in the labor market, so that any empirical study must
analyze men and women separately. Most important, an examinationof the
literature makes it clear that there has been little systematic thought about the
role of beauty in the labor market, and that the empirical analysis of this issue
has been limited to tabulations and regressions holding at most one or two
variables (usually age) constant.
ILL. A Model of Looks and Occupational Choice
Our approach to modeling the existence of looks —based differences
in labor —marketoutcomes assumes that in some occupations attractive
workers may be more productive than unattractive workers.This
"productivity" advantage could arise from customer discrimination,with
consumers preferring to be served by better—looking individuals; orthere may
be occupations where physical attractiveness enhances the worker's ability to
engage in productive interactions withcoworkers. Prima facie evidence
supporting this assumption is provided by a recent surveyof employers
(Holzer, 1993), who were asked "How important or unimportantis attractive
physical appearance [for the job most recently filled]?"Eleven percent
responded that appearance was very important, while 39 percentfelt that it was
somewhat important.
We begin by assuming an economy with two occupations, one in
which beauty enhances productivity, one in which it does not. There is also
one other factor that affects productivity in both occupations,but which may




where i refers to an individual and a1, a2> 0. Attractiveness is measured by
b, which takes the value 1 for half the population (attractive workers) and —1
for the other half (unattractive workers). The other productivity —enhancing
characteristic x takes the value of 1 for half the population and 0 for the other
half. Assume finally that x and b are independently distributed, so that there
are four equal—sized groups of workers.
Since workers seek to maximize income, they choose Occupation 1
if w1 —w1>0,or [a1 —a2]x1>b1,and Occupation 2 otherwise.If
a —a2<1,there is no mixing; all attractive workers choose Occupation
2 and all unattractive workers choose Occupation 1. The average wage for
attractive workers is .5a2 +1,while the average wage for the unattractive is
.5a1. There is a measured looks differential in this economy whether or not
one controls for x; but that differential is identical to the wage premium for
working in Occupation 2.
If a2 —a1> 1, some unattractive workers (those with x= 1, b= —1)
choose Occupation 2, as do all attractive workers. The rest of the unattractive
population chooses Occupation 1. In this situation the average wage for
attractive workers is still higher than the average wage for unattractive
workers: E[wlb= 1] =.5a2+1,while E[wlb= —1] =.5a2
—.5. There
is also a differential within Occupation 2 between the attractive and the
unattractive: The average wage of attractive workers in Occupation 2 is
.5a2 +1,while the average wage for unattractive workers there is a2 —1.
If one does not condition on x, there will appear to be a premium for
unattractive workers who have jobs in the "beautiful" occupation, and if
a2 >4,unattractive workers in Occupation 2 will earn more than the average
wage for attractive workers. If one does condition on x, the looks differential
6within Occupation 2 will be the same as the looks differential for the economy
as a whole.
If a2 —a1>1,the occupation that rewards beauty also gives a
relatively high reward for the productivity —enhancing factor, leading
unattractive workers with large endowments of that factor to accept the looks
penalty to get the higher return for the factor. This positiveselection may
make it seem as though there is a pay premium for unattractive workers in the
occupation dominated by their better—looking counterparts.
When a2 —a1<—1,all unattractive workers choose Occupation 1,
as do all attractive workers with x =1.The average wage for attractive
workers remains above the average wage for unattractive workers, with
E[wlb=l1 =.5a1+.5, andE[wlb=—1]=.5a1.Ifonedoesnotcondition
on x, there appears to be a gain to the attractive workersfrom mixing with the
unattractive, as the wage for attractive workers in Occupation 1 is a1 ,greater
than the wage of 1 earned by the attractive workers in Occupation 2.The
looks differential in Occupation 1 will be greater than the overalllooks
differential only if a1 >2.
In this simple model there is no case in which both occupations will
be integrated; but adding a second x to the model generates cases with mixing
in both occupations. In general, a model with many x's and many occupations
would have unattractive workers locating where beauty is rewarded whenever
those occupations also give a high relative reward to some other characteristic
with which the unattractive worker is abundantly endowed. Obversely, an
attractive worker would choose an occupation which did not reward beautyif
it provided a high relative reward for that worker's particular bundleof other
characteristics.
The discussion has assumed no correlation between b and x. The
mixing and the differences in differentials arise from featuresof technology —
— — isthere an occupation that rewards attractiveness and also happens to give
7a relatively high reward to some other factor? Introducing acorrelation
between x and b into the simple model does not change the conclusions about
the values of the a's for which mixing will or will not occur. It does, though,
affect pay differentials in obvious ways. For example, if x and b are
positively correlated and there is sorting of some unattractive workers into
occupation 2, the overall looks differential will remain larger than the
differential within occupation 2, but both will grow in absolute value.
An obvious alternative to a model with productivity or consumer
discrimination generating looks —based differences in labor —market outcomes
has them resulting from employer discrimination against the unattractive. A
Becker —typemodel with employers' distaste for unattractive employees
produces a looks differential in earnings, but no systematic sorting of workers
into occupations on the basis of appearance. Alternatively, a model with
employers discriminating against the less attractive only when filling certain
positions leads to a looks differential resulting from occupational crowding.
Such a model also implies sorting into occupations on the basis of
attractiveness, although it does not indicate a priori which occupations should
exhibit concentrations of attractive or unattractive people. However, in the
occupational —crowding model the unattractive worker who obtains a job in
one of the occupations ordinarily reserved for the attractive suffers no earnings
penalty —— — thelooks differential is linked to occupations, not individuals.
• Is it possible to distinguish empirically between the model we have
presented and an employer —discriminationor occupational —crowdingmodel?
In theory the answer is yes, but in practice it may be quite difficult. Consider
the simple model with two occupations and two x's. If we could control for
both x's, we would fmd unattractive workers earning less than attractive
workers only in certain occupations (contrary to the Becker model). The
unattractive worker could not achieve a wage gain by moving into an
occupation dominated by attractive workers (as he or she could in an
8occupational —crowding model). In a wage regression that included the x's,
attractiveness and occupational dummy variables and interactions between
them, the Becker model should produce a non —zerocoefficient only on the
attractiveness dummy; the crowding model only on the occupational dummy;
and the productivity model only on the interaction term.
The reliability of such a test would be compromised, however, if one
of the x's was not observed. For example, if the unobserved x received a
relatively large reward in the occupation that also rewarded attractiveness, the
regression described above could produce non —zerocoefficients on the
occupational and attractiveness dummies as well as on the interaction term.5
This could also occur if looks differentials in the labor market were the result
both of employer discrimination against the unattractive and productivity
advantages to the attractive in some occupations.
Beyond problems related to unobserved variables are those associated
with identifying occupations where employer discrimination against the
unattractive might exist, or alternatively, those where attractiveness might lead
to greater productivity. To the extent that the latter occupations are
identifiable, finding that more attractive workers were more heavily
concentrated in such occupations would support the productivity model.
Our empirical strategy is guided by the productivity model. We first
determine whether standard earnings equations yield a looks differential, and
then whether that differential differs across occupations in ways the model
suggests. In addition, we look for evidence of the sorting implied by the
productivity model, checking whether more attractive workers tend to be
concentrated in those occupations where one might suspect that attractive
people have a productivity advantage. We present the productivity model to
illustrate that the existence of looks differentials does not necessarily result
from employer discrimination against the unattractive. Discovering evidence
9in favor of this model does not, though, disprove the existenceof such
discrimination.
IV. Data
Two broad household surveys for the U.S. and one for Canada
provide data on the respondents' looks as well as on the usual labor —market
and demographic variables of interest to economists. The 1977 Quality of
Employment Survey (QES) contains information on 1515 workers.This
Survey has the advantage of including great detail aboutlabor—market
behavior, but the disadvantage of including only labor—force participants.
The second American data set is the Quality of American Life survey (QAL)
in 1971, which contains interviews of 2164 respondents. For our purposes
this study has the advantage of having substantial background information on
the respondents, but the disadvantage of containing relatively fewer variables
describing the worker's job than does the QES. The Canadian Quality ofLife
study (QOL) contains 3415 observations in 1981. This study has noneof the
disadvantages of the two American data sets and the additional attractionof
providing (for a much smaller subsample that constitutes a three—year panel)
three observations on each respondent's looks.
All three surveys asked the interviewer to "rate [or categorize] the
respondent's physical appearance" on the five—point scale shown in Table 1,
along which looks range from strikingly handsome or beautiful tohomely.6
The distributions of the ratings in the three surveys are shown in Table 2.
(For the Canadian data we present averages based on all the respondents
included in the three—year study.) Among both men and women roughly half
are rated as average; and many more are rated above—average than areviewed
as below —average.Either Canadians are better —lookingthan Americans; or
Canadian interviewers (perhaps the populace generally) are less willing to
describe someone as having below —average looks. What is most interesting
is that the ratings of women are more dispersed around the middle category.
10This is a common finding in the social —psychological literature: Women's
appearances evoke stronger reactions, both positiveand negative, than do
men's (Hatfield and Sprecher, 1986).
Very few people are rated as strikingly beautiful (handsome) or as
homely. Thus while we make some use of the full five—point scale, in most
of the work we use the three—fold distinction above—average, average and
below—average. Even this means that the cell sizes for some of the
categories, e.g., below —average looking people in the QAL, are not very
large.
All three surveys offer a variety of measures of earnings. In all of
them we chose to calculate hourly earnings as annual earnings divided by 52
timesweekly hours.7In the analyses involving hourly earnings all
respondents who worked less than 20 hours per week and who earned less than
$ .75perhour in the QAL ($1 per hour in the QES and the QOL) are
excluded, as are the self—employed and all those for whom data on the
various control variables are unavailable.8 The empirical work people
includes only workers ages 18—64.
Other variables defined for the analyses of hourly earnings and
included in all three data sets are: marital status (which we measure as a
zero —one dummy variable, married or not); education, defined as a vector of
dummy variables measuring high—school completion, some college, or a
college degree or more; and one—digit industry. Self—reported health status
is included in all the regressions. Most important, anyone whose health status
in the QES is listed as "totally and permanently disabled" or the next most
severe category on a seven—point subjective scale is excluded from all the
empirical work. In the QAL a respondent is excluded if health "prevents
him/her from doing lots of things," while in the QOL anyone whose self—
reported health status is not at least rated as "fair" isexcluded.9 These
exclusions minimize any spurious results stemming from a possible correlation
11between physical appearance and major physicaldisabilities that reduce
productivity.
Since the purpose is to control for as many other causes of variation
in earnings as possible, we define the set of regressors quite broadly.In the
QES and QOL the data allow the constructionof actual labor—market
experience, years of tenure with the firm, and an indicatorof union status. In
the former establishment size is included, while the latter includes firm size.
In the QAL experience is measured as age —schooling
—6.In estimates
based on the two American data sets we include dummy variables for race and
for location in the South, while in the QOL we include a vector ofvariables
for Canada's regions and an indicator of whether the person does not speak
English at home. Finally, the QAL allows us to include measuresof the
respondents' fathers' occupations, of their early childhood backgroundand of
their immigrant status and that of their parents and grandparents.
V. Looks and Earnings
The most interesting economic question involving beauty is probably
its relation to an individual's economic success. In Section III we suggested
three possible reasons for a premium for beauty or a penalty for ugliness in the
labor market:Pure employer discrimination, customer
discriminationfproductivity, and occupational crowding. In order to examine
these we need to know first whether earnings differentials based on beauty
even exist.
We make no claim to be able to estimate a structural model of a
hedonic market for looks. Rather, in the first part of this Section we present
estimates of standard earnings equations that allow for the possibility of
differences in earnings related to looks. In the final part we synthesize the
findings to infer what we have learned from this approach about theexistence
of such earnings differentials.
12A. Estimates of the Relationship of Looks and Earnings
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 present estimates of earnings
equations based on the data from the QES and on a three —point rating of
beauty. Columns (1) and (5)ofTable 4 do the same using data from the
QAL, as do columns (1) and (5)ofTable 5forthe QOL. In these and
subsequent tables we present the probabilities (p) related to the F— statistic
testing the joint significance of the variables reflecting individuals' beauty.
Of the six equations we find that the pair of beauty variables is jointly
significantly nonzero at some conventional level in four cases. Moreover, in
all six groups people with above—average looks receive a pay premium,
ranging from as little as 1 percent to a high estimate of 13 percent (for women
in the QAL). In five groups (excluding only women in the QAL) workers
with below—average looks receive a pay penalty, ranging from 1 percent to
as large as 15 percent. Not all of these individual coefficients are significantly
different from zero. Many are, though; and the consistency of the pattern
across three independent samples suggests that the finding of pay premia and
penalties for looks is robust.
The estimates based on the QES indicate that more attractive people
are paid more. However, the premia for good looks are considerably smaller
than the penalties for bad looks and are not statistically significant. The
results for men are corroborated by the QAL results in Table 4, with positive
estimated coefficients for above—average looks categories and (larger) negative
wage penalties for those in below—average looks categories. They are,
though, contradicted by the estimates from the QOL in Table 5. In that
sample there is a significant premium for good —lookingmen, but a tiny and
insignificant penalty for men of below —average looks. A similar disagreement
exists in the estimates for women. The large penalties for ugliness in the QES
are replicated in the Canadian QOL, but are contradicted by a positive
coefficient for below —average looking women in the QAL. The small premia
13for above—average looking women in those two samples are also contradicted
by the statistically significant and large premium for attractiveness in the QAL.
The similarity of the premia and penalties across the two genders is
also interesting. In the results from the QES they are nearly identical. In the
QAL there is a larger penalty for below—average—looking men than for
women, but a larger premium for good—looking women. The opposite
pattern holds in the QOL. Among people who choose to work at least half
time, beauty does not generate hugely different effects on the earnings of
women and men.
While the results are qualitatively similar in the three samples, one
might worry still more about the robustness of the estimates. One concern is
that each interviewer might have a different standard for beauty. These
differences could be regarded as a form of measurement error, lowering the
efficiency of our estimates and biasing them to the extent that interviewer
standards were spuriously correlated with respondents' earnings. To account
for any potential problems this might cause, columns (2) and (6) of Tables 4
and 5reestimatethese reduced —formearnings equations using intei-viewer —
specificfixed effects for the QAL and QOL respectively. Among men the
penalty for ugliness increases slightly in both samples; but the changes in the
premium for good looks are in opposite directions. Among women the
unexpected positive effect of below —averagelooks becomes larger, but none
of the other estimates of penalties and premia is affected much. Taken
together, the results suggest clearly that the relation between looks and
earnings does not arise from idiosyncratic ratings by particular
interviewers.10
Another worry is about variables that are necessarily excluded from
some or all of the samples because they are unavailable. Obviously, variables
in the latter group cannot be examined here. But in the former group we can
consider the impact of excluding the worker's family background and
14intelligence. Including the family background measures from the QAL,asin
Table 4, lowered the absolute values of the estimated looks premia and
penalties by less than .005 for men, and by less than .02 for women. Had we
also included in columns (1) and (5) of Table 4 a dummy variable for workers
whose IQ was rated by the interviewer as being in the top 7 percent, the
absolute values of the coefficients for men would fall by .002 each and those
for women would fall by .006 each. Despite the positive correlation between
IQ and beauty, the changes are tiny. They do not alter the inferences from
Table 4 or from the estimates based on the other data sets.
Columns (2) and (5) in Table 3 ((3) and (7) in Table 4) estimate the
relationship between hourly earnings and looks using the complete five—point
rating scheme. For men in the QES the results are remarkable: Hourly
earnings rise with each successively higher rating of a worker's appearance.
Among women in the QES and men in the QAL this is true except for
strikingly handsome or beautiful workers. For women in the QAL the
monotonic relationship is broken by the earnings premium received by plain
women. Using the five—fold distinction adds little to the ability to explain
hourly earnings (increasing the R 2intwo cases, decreasing it in two others);
and it in no way alters our conclusions about premia and penalties for looks.
A long, large and still growing literature (e.g., Taubman, 1975;
McLean and Moon, 1980; and Averett and Korenman, 1993) has studied the
relation between weight and/or height and earnings. We can test whether our
results merely demonstrate that these few bodily characteristics explain the
beauty penalties and premia by including measures of height and weight in the
earnings equations. In the QES the interviewer rated the respondent's weight
on a five—point scale and estimated the respondent's height in inches, while
only height is available in the QAL.'1 For both samples we fonned dummy
variables based on height, categorizing women as tall if they exceeded 5'9" (6'
for men) or short if they were below 5' (5'6" for men). Self—explanatory
15dummy variables for people who are obese, or only overweight, were
constructed for the QES sample.
The results of adding these measures to the earnings regressions that
contain the three—fold rating of beauty are shown in columns (3) and (6) of
Table 3 and columns (4) and (8) of Table 4. Other than wage premia for both
short and tall women in the QAL and a penalty for short men in the QES none
of these variables has a coefficient that exceeds its standard error. Most
important, including these measures of body type haslittle effect on the
coefficients on the ratings of beauty in all four samples —— muchtoo small
to suggest that the relationship between looks and earnings arisesfrom any
possible correlation between appearance and height or weight.
The Canadian data allow us to examine whether additional
information about an individual's looks beyond that contained in a rating by
one interviewer adds to our ability to infer the impact of looks on earnings.
For the subset of respondents included in the bottom part of Table 1 the study
provides three independent estimates of an individual's looks. One approach
to using this information would be to create a set of dummy variables for each
of the ten combinations of looks ratings based on the three —foldclassification
for each of the three years. This has the difficulties of producing a few very
sparsely occupied cells and of ignoring information contained in the five —fold
classification.
• An alternative approach uses the interviewers' ratings to infer the
respondents' underlying beauty. Denote the individual's true beauty by B.
Let B be normally distributed n(O, 1), an arbitrary scaling that does not affect
the results (Terza, 1987). For any particular year we assume that the
interviewer assigns a rating along the five —pointscale based on her estimate
of B. The information in Table 2 for the entire population implies that the
informational content of a person's rating as homely, for example, is that the
16person is in the lowest 2.5 percent of the population. The best estimate ofthat
person's B is B =E(BIB<N1(.025)).12Similar inferences can be drawn
based on partitioning the normal distribution for each of the other ratings
using the population percentages in Table 2.
Given the inference about B for one year, an estimate of a
respondent's true beauty is B, the average of the three independent estimates
B. To illustrate what this scheme implies, consider an example of the
underlying beauty of a particular pair of respondents. One person is rated as
average in all three years (like 26.3 percent of the sample members); the other
is rated as above average in one year, average in another and below average
in the third (like 1.0 percent of the sample). Because few respondents are
rated below average, we infer that the second person's true beauty is less than
the first person's.
We calculate B for each sample member used in the estimates in
Table 5 who was in the panel for all three years. Columns (3) and (6) of
Table 5 present estimates on this narrower sample using linear and quadratic
terms in the B for 1981.13 Columns (4) and (8) replace the estimate of
beauty for 1981 by the beauty index B based on all three years of information
about the worker's looks. This substitution adds to the significance of the
equations for both men and women. Obtaining additional information on a
worker's beauty provides additional information about his or her earnings.
Workers whose beauty is estimated to be higher earn more, and the marginal
impact of additional beauty is diminishing. Here there is an asynmietric effect
of looks on earnings, with lesser rewards for additional beauty and increasing
penalties for increasingly bad looks.
B. Synthesis of the Basic Results, and an Initial Internretation
Tables 3—5 stand on their own and provide the basic evidence for the
existence of earnings differentials based on beauty. Nonetheless, it is useful
to summarize the results to infer what the three sets of data imply are the best
17estimates of the penalties and premia associated with looks. Table 6 presents
such summaries, for both genders separately and for the entire set of
observations, and for all three samples combined and for the two American
samples alone. The estimates are from regressions that poolthe samples in
Tables 3—5(orTables 3 and 4 only) and that allow the regression coefficients
on all variables other than the beauty measures to differ acrossthe samples.
Pooling the samples for men and women alone is not rejected by the data;and
for each gender both the penalty and premium are significantly nonzero.
Indeed, even pooling the data for both genders for all three samples is not
rejected; and the penalties and premia in both sets of pooled equations areall
significantly nonzero.
The results make it clear that there is a significant penalty for bad
looks among men. The 9 percent of working men who are viewed as being
below average or homely are penalized about 10 percent in hourly earnings,
other things equal. The 32 percent who are viewed as having above —average
looks or even as handsome receive an earnings premium of 5percent.Among
women there is some evidence of a premium for good looks, with an average
effect of about 4 percent; the penalty for bad looks (for the lowest 8 percent
of working women) is only 5percent.Among women neither effect alone is
highly significant, though they are jointly significant. Finally, the combined
results in the bottom two rows suggest a 7 to 10 percent penalty for being in
the lowest 10 percent of looks among all workers, and a 5percentpremium
for being in the top 30 percent.
While the absolute values of the point estimates of the penalties
generally exceed the estimates of the earnings premia, these differences are not
significant. There is only weak evidence of asymmetry in how the labor
market treats ugliness and beauty.14
Some might interpret our results as merely showing that the
unobserved determinants of productivity generate extra earnings that are used
18to improve a worker's beauty. There is the conventional problem associated
with any hedonic estimation, i.e., those with higher wages holding constant
the observables will choose to invest more in beauty. Unfortunately, as is
usual, our data are not rich enough to permit a credible simultaneity
correction. Two arguments, though, suggest the problem is not crucial here.
First, the social —psychological evidence we mentioned in Section II showed
how little individuals' relative physical appearances change during adulthood.
That suggests there is limited scope for using unexplained earnings differences
to "buy" differences in beauty. Second, and more telling, if differences in
unexplained earnings were used to affect beauty ratings, their persistence over
a working life should lead to a greater simultaneity bias among older than
among younger workers, and thus smaller apparent penalties and premia if we
restrict the samples in Tables 3—5toworkers ages 18—30. In fact, all beauty
premia and penalties in the QES are larger in this subsample than in the basic
estimates in Table 3. In the other two samples half the estimates increase in
absolute value, half decrease. There is no evidence of a weaker relation
between earnings and beauty among younger workers.
Another possible explanation for our findings is a possible tendency
for greater attractiveness and higher earnings in adulthood to be joint products
of a priviliged family background. Only the QAL contained variables (e.g.
father's occupation) that allowed us to attempt to control for such effects. If
family background in general were important, one would expect these partial
indicators of it to have a noticeable effect on the estimates. They do not,
suggesting that the unobservable background measures are unlikely to be
biasing our results seriously.'5
These three pieces of evidence reinforce the conclusion that,
whatever the causes, people who are better—looking receive higher pay, while
bad—looking people earn less than average, other things equal. It is crucial
to stress that these penalties and premia reflect the effects of beauty in all its
19aspects, not merely one of its many components such as height, weight,
complexion, facial structure, etc.
VI. The Absence of Differences by Gender
Particularly surprising in light of some popular discussion (e.g.,
Wolf, 1991) is the absence of significantly larger penalties and premia,
especially the latter, for women than for men. If anything, the evidence goes
in the opposite direction: Men's looks may have bigger effects on their
earnings than do women's. One simple explanation might be that our results
are a statistical artifact produced because the beauty ratings are a noisier signal
of women's physical appearance than of men's. The evidence contradicts this:
In the longitudinal part of the QOL the beauty ratings of women are slightly
kvariableover the three years than those of men.
One way that beauty can affect women's labor—market success is by
influencing their labor—force participation. To examine this possibility we
estimate standard labor—force participation probits that include the measures
of attractiveness. These are estimated for married women (the overwhelming
majority of the samples) for both the QAL and the QOL, and for the
longitudinal subsample of the QOL.
The coefficients on the beauty measures included in these probits are
shown in the first four columns of Table 7. The t—statistics on the above—
average looks rating are tiny and the coefficients are always nearly zero.
There is little evidence that good —lookingwomen are more likely to be in the
labor force than otherwise identical women. Though the estimates from the
QAL are not significantly nonzero, the effects of below —average looks on
women's participation are negative in that sample; and in the QOL these
effects are significantly negative. They also are not small. For example, the
6 percent of married women with below —average looks are 8 percent less
likely to partipate than average—looking women.16
20There is thus some evidence that women select themselves out of the
labor force if they are particularly unattractive. Thisselectivity,though, has
no important impact on the basic estimates of the effects of looks on earnings
(in columns (5)ofTabLes 4 and 5). Correcting for selectivity in the QAL
changes the estimated premium associated with above —average looks from
128 to .130. Accounting for this form of selectivity does not alter the
premium in the QOL and changes the earnings penalty from —.058to —.036.
Another possibility is that looks affect women's economic success by
altering their opportunities for marriage. Holding constant a woman's age and
educational attainment, in all three samples her physical appearance is
completely unrelated to her likelihood of being married. It does, though,
affect the quality of the husband whom she marries. We use data on
husband's education in the QES to estimate ordered probits that include our
standard pair of measures of physical appearance of the married woman (and
also her health, her husband's age and her education, to account for assortive
mating). •The results, presented in column (5)ofTable 7, also show that
above—average looks have essentially no effect on the outcome, in this case
on the quality of the husband to whom the woman is matched. However, all
else equal below—average looking women marry men whose educational
attainment is less than what the women's own educational attainment
predicts.'7 Women face an additional economic penalty for bad looks in the
form of marriage to husbands whose potential earnings ability is less.
The results show that the economic penalties facing below—average
looking women are not limited to hourly earnings. Both their success in the
marriage market and their likelihood of working outside the home are reduced
by their bad looks. No such effects exist for below —average looking men;
and there is no apparent premium in the marriage market or extra effect on
participation for either good —looking women or men.
21VII. Sorting, Productivity or Discrimination?
Having demonstrated that the labor market does reward beauty, we
now consider the sources of the penalties and premia. The model presented
in Section III demonstrated that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of
customer discrimination/productivity differences and the sorting they induce
from the effects of employer discrimination. It suggested that to examine
these issues we need to learn how workers are sorted into occupations and to
discover how the earnings regressions of Tables 3—5areaffected if the beauty
measures are interacted with measures of the possible importanceof beauty in
the occupation.
A test for sorting requires prior determination of the occupations
where looks are likely to enhance productivity. In the absence of a widely
accepted objective measure for detennining this, we use three independent
subjective methods. The first is based on the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT) (U.S. Department of Labor, 1977). We assign each worker to
a DOT occupation using three—digit occupational codes in both the QESand
the QAL and note the DOT measure of "the job's relationship to people".
Since physical attractiveness can affect productivity through the worker's
interactions with customers or coworkers, we classify jobs with DOT measures
that suggest an important role for interpersonal communication as ones in
which looks are important)8
The second method relies on the opinions of eight adults with at least
one year of full —timelabor —marketexperience who were asked to rate each
of the three—digit occupations on a three—point scale: 0, looks are probably
not important; 1, looks might be important; and 2, looks are definitely
important.
19Ifthe average rating of the occupation exceeded .5,wetreat
looks as being important in the occupation and form a dummy variable
reflecting this average of the subjective ratings.
22The third measure uses the survey (Hoizer, 1993) in which employers
were asked if an applicant's appearance was an important consideration in
filling the most recent job vacancy. The occupational category of the vacancy
was also recorded, as was the gender of the applicant hired. We first divided
the survey data on the basis of the gender of the worker hired, then compiled
for each gender a list of occupations that seemed fairly homogeneous with
respect to the importance of appearance and for which there were at least ten
observations.Next we calculated for each occupation/gender cell the
percentage of employers responding that appearance was very important or
somewhat important and matched these cell percentages where possible to
workers from the QES and the QAL.2°
The Appendix Table lists the occupational categories chosen from the
employer survey data, along with the cell sizes and percentages of employers
responding that appearance was important. For men we defme an occupation
as one with "looks important" if more than 40 percent of the employers
responded that appearance was important; for women, the dividing line is 44
percent. The Appendix Table shows that occupations with higher percentages
are generally those with more contact between the worker and the firm's
customers.
If workers sort themselves among occupations/employers based in part
on the relative productivity of their beauty, we would observe the highest
average rating of individuals' looks in those occupationswhere our indexes
suggest looks matter most. Table 8 presents the fractions of workersin each
of the three categories of individuals' looks who work in occupations where
looks are important. With three rating schemes for the occupations, two
samples and both genders we have constructed twelve tests for occupational
sorting. Formal tests for sorting yield significant x2—statisticsin only four
of the twelve rows. A good way to sunimarize the results is that all three
rating schemes yield a significant relationship between our measures ofthe
23importance of beauty in an occupation and the beauty of workers in that
occupation in the QAL but not in the QES. But in seven of the twelve rows
the percentage of workers in jobs where looks are important is monotonically
increasing as one moves up the scale of individuals' looks. More important,
ui ten of them above—average looking people are most likely to work in
occupations where looks are important.
The results in Table 8 provide some weak evidence of sorting across
occupations by beauty. Whether the weakness of the evidence is due to
imperfections in our proxies for differences in the importance of beauty among
occupations or to the relatively minor role that sorting by beauty plays is
unclear. Taken at face value, though, the results give some support to the idea
that the effects of beauty on earnings that we demonstrated in Section V are
at least partly associated with sorting.
As discussed in Section III, it is worth knowing the extent to which
the earnings differential is a function of some feature of the occupation rather
than the appearance of the individual. To examine this issue we augment the
earnings regressions of Tables 3—5withdummy variables signifying whether
or not looks are important in an occupation and with interactions between
these variables and the individual's own looks. The occupational —crowding
model would lead one to expect more of the looks differential to be captured
by the occupation variables, while productivity/customer discrimination or
pure employer—discrimination would lead these terms tohave little effect.
The results of this test are shown in Table 9, which presents equations
analogous to those in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 (columns (1) and (5) of
Table 4). For the DOT and subjective measures the samples are identical to
those used in Tables 3 and 4.The coefficients on the main effects
representing the respondents' own beauty are not greatly different from what
they were in those tables; and the p —values on the F —statistics testing the pair
of variables also differ little from the corresponding estimates in those tables.
24Even holding constant occupational beauty, below—average looking workers
receive substantial penalties (except, as before, for women in the QAL) and
above—average looking workers receive earnings premia (especially women
in the QAL).In the samples using the employer—based estimates of
occupational looks, which contain roughly 40 percent fewer observations, the
effects of the workers' own looks are significant at least at a low level in three
of the four cases.
The main effects of occupational looks exceed their standard errors
in six of the twelve equations. The R 2hereare higher for the QES men,
lower for the QES women, and higher in one case, lower in the other for both
QAL samples than in Tables 3 and 4, while in the reduced samples using the
employer—based indexes the R2areincreased in three of the four cases.2'
Taken together, the estimates provide a hint that occupational requirements
for beauty may produce independent effects on earnings; but we cannot reject
the possibility that they have no effect.
This exercise demonstrates one thing very clearly: The effects of an
individual's own looks on his or her earnings are very robust. That there are
earnings premia and penalties for looks independent of occupation suggests
that occupational crowding along the dimension of looks is not the chief cause
of those premia and penalties. That there is some evidence of sorting implies
that pure employer discrimination does not alone describe the role of beauty
in the labor market. Tables 8 and 9 suggest that at least part of the
explanation for the apparent impact of individuals' looks on their earnings is
that beauty is productive, arising perhaps from the effects of customers'
preferences, and/or that pure employer discrimination on the basis of looks
exists. We cannot, though, determine how much of the total effect stems from
these two possible sources.
25VHI. Conclusions and Implications
In empirical analyses based on three distinct sets of household data we
have discovered a number of facts about beauty in the labor market. Other
things equal, the wages of people with below—average looks are lower than
those of average—looking workers; and there is a premium in wages for
good —looking people that is slightly smaller than this penalty. The penalty
and premium may be higher for men, but these gender differences are not
large. There is some evidence that the labor market sorts the best —looking
people into occupations where their looks are productive.
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of alternative sources of
earnings differentials in the data. Nonetheless, our finding that individuals
receive earnings penalties and premia even after we account for their
occupations suggests that occupational crowding does not explain how beauty
affects the labor market. Other explanations, such as inherent productivity
differences, the possibe effects of customer discrimination, or taste—based
employer/employee discrimination seem to provide better explanations.22
More light could be shed on these questions by examinations of the
relationship between looks and earnings within particular narrowly —defmed
occupations.
That there is a payoff in the labor market for good looks and a
penalty for bad looks should be obvious without our demonstration: Why else
would workers spend time on grooming before going to work; and why would
they spend money on clothing and other items designed to enhance their
appearance at work? What our demonstration shows is the magnitude of the
incentives to expend these resources and the mechanisms by which they might
arise. The results lead naturally to studying other issues in discrimination
along various dimensions, such as physical and mental handicaps. In each case
the method we have developed to aid distinguishing between
26productivity/discrimination and occupational sorting can be applied mutatis
mutandis to discover the source of other apparently discriminatory outcomes.
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29FOOTNOTES
1. Examples of each are Blau andBelier(1992); Borjas and
Tienda (1985); Bloom and Grenier (1992), and Fechter and
Thorpe (1978).
2. Quoted by Fred Siegel, "The Cult of Multiculturalism,"
New Republic, February 18, 1991, p. 38, from an official
document from Smith College. The legislation was proposed
in the Philippine Congress, reported by the Associated Press,
December 13, 1992. The case law and the ADA are discussed
by McAdams et a! (1992). A recent case is Hodgdon v. Mt.
Mansfield Company, November 6, 1992, in which the
Vermont Supreme Court ruled that a chambermaid's lack of
upper teeth qualified as a handicap protected under the state's
Fair Employment Practices Act.
3. Given the distributions across the five categories only 75
percent would be so classified randomly. While 35 percent
are classified identically in all three years, only 22 percent
would be categorized this way randomly.
4. An unpublished work in the late 1970s by Robert Frank of
Cornell University correlated earnings of recent Cornell
graduates with ratings of their appearance (from pictures) by
a group of current undergraduates.
5.Thispotential omitted —variable problem is distinct from
the problem of unobserved productivity that is correlated with
attractiveness. In addition to biasing attempts to estimate a
looks differential, the latter correlation could be the basis for
a sort of statistical discrimination, in which attractiveness was
used by employers as a noisy signal of some other productivity
factor.
6. These are the only broadly —basedsurveys we could find
that contain such information. A number of othersurveys,
including one interesting proprietary data set used in a (racial)
discrimination case by Mark Killingsworth, contain
information on the worker's general appearance. This latter
is more likely to be influenced by income than the physical
appearance measures that are available in our samples.7. All the equations were recomputed using annual earnings,
with weekly hours included as an independent variable. None
of our conclusions is changed qualitatively by this
modification.
8. Note that in 1971 in the U.S. the minimum wage was
$1.60per hour and in 1977 was $2.30. In Canada in 1981
the federal minimum was $3.50, and some provincial minima
were even higher. The disqualifications on the wage rate are
thus designed to exclude those observations for which
measurement errors are likely. Excluding the small fraction
of workers whose estimated hourly wage is far below statutory
minima does not imply any selectivity on a characteristic that
is correlated with looks. In the QAL, for example, there is no
relation at even the 20 percent level of significance between
the beauty measures and the probability of exclusion from the
sample for this reason. Even if there were, the fraction of
people so excluded is below 5 percent of the sample.
9. Of the respondents in the QES between the ages of 18 and
64 this disqualified 10; from the QAL, 126; and from the
QOL, 18.
10. One related possibility is that interviewers of different
sexes rate the respondents differently. This possibility is also
handled by the estimates using interviewer fixed effects. It is
not likely to be a problem in any case, since 95 percent of the
respondents in the two American samples were interviewed by
women. A related problem is that there may be differences in
the interviewers' ability to classify workers of different races.
Unsurprisingly, given that the overwhelming majority of the
respondents are white, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 change
only minutely when African—Americans are deleted from the
sample.
11. The rating scale for weight (in descending order) was:
"Obese;" "overweight;" "average for height;" "underweight,"
and "skinny." Among women (men) 3.2 (.7) percent were
rated obese; 19.6 (17.4) percent were rated overweight; 65.8
(72.7) percent were considered average; 11.2 (8.5) percent
were rated underweight, and .2 (.7) percent were rated skinny.12. The expectations are of a doubly—truncated normal
density and are calculated based on Johnson and Kotz (1970).
13. If the pair of dummy variabLes used in columns (2) and
(6) is included instead here, the R2are slightly lower, .283
for men and .408 for women.
14. Remember that hourly earnings were calculated using
actual weelcly hours, but assuming that all workers spent the
same number of weeks employed. The QES and QOL provide
data on weeks of layoff in the last year in the QES (two years
in the QOL). Tobit estimates of the detenninants of weeks of
layoff (for the roughly 7 percent of males who reported having
been laid off) were produced and included controls for
education level, experience, union status, tenure with the firm,
and firm or establishment size.In both samples the t—
statistics on the dummy variable for above—average looks
were below .5 in absolute value. Bad looks raised the
probability of layoff and lengthened its duration, with t —
statisticsof 1.54 in the QES (1.40 in the QOL). The
conclusion that there is only weak asymmetry in the effect of
looks on hourly earnings becomes a bit stronger when we
consider effects on weeks of involuntary unemployment.
15. We are indebted to Bob Willis for suggesting this point.
16. Not surprisingly, similar probits on men's labor—force
participation yielded no relationship between looks and the
probability of participation.
17. The same ordered probits estimated for the education of
wives of married men in the QES generated very small
coefficients on the beauty variables, with t —statistics below .3
in absolute value.
18. We rely on the fifth digit of the DOT code, which can
take nine different values according to whether the job
involves"mentoring,""negotiating,""instructing,"
"supervising,""diverting,""persuading,""speaking,
signaling," "serving," or "taking instructions, helping." We
treat all but the last as indications that interpersonal interaction
is an important aspect of the occupation.19. The 28 pairwise correlations of the ratings of the 504
occupations ranged from .36 to .61, with a mean of .47.
20.The survey targeted employers of low—education
workers. This produced too few observations in several broad
occupation cells to calculate occupational beauty ratings,
preventing many QES and QAL sample members from being
included in this part of the analysis.
21. A more straightforward test simply includes a vector of
dummy variables for one—digit occupations in the basic
equation for both samples and sexes. (Finer detail is not
possible given some of the cell sizes.) The coefficients on the
dummy variables for below —andabove —averagelooks are
hardly altered in size or significance. Among the QES men
(women), the coefficients (analogous to those in columns (1)
and (4) of Table 3) become —.156 and .014 (—.100 and
.026). Among the QAL men (women), the coefficients
(analogous to those in columns (1) and (5) of Table 4) become
—.059 and .062 (.068 and .115).
22. Another possibility (alluded to in footnote 5) is that
attractiveness is a signal of otherwise unobservable (to the
employer) productivity.If this were so, and employers
learned about workers' productivity as theyacquire tenure, the
impact of looks would diminish as tenure increases.
Reestimates of the basic equations in Tables 3 and 5 for the
QES (QOL) based on workers with at least three (five) years
of tenure with the firm refute this possibility. Of the eight
coefficients on physical appearance four are larger in absolute
value, four smaller, and the only change greater than one
standard error is the higher penalty for below —average
looking senior men in the QOL.Table 1. Ratings of Beauty, Canadian Quality of Life, 1977, 1979. 1981
First Year
Transition Matrices. 1977-79, 1979-81 Combined
MEN (N—1504)
Second Year
1 2 3 4 5
Strikingly handsome 1














1977—79: X2(16) —151.78;1979—81: x2(16) —142.67.
WOMEN (N —2147)
Strikingly handsome I








4 0.0 0.8 6.22.0
5 0.0 0.1 0.20.2
1979—81: x2(16) —169.17.
Swiunary of Three-year Transition Matrix
BOTH GENDERS (N —1330)











26.3 19.7 6.8 1.0















TOTAL 34.8 36.021.9 1.71.5 3.20.7 0.00.2





0.1Table 2. Distribution of Looks: Quality of Employment Survey, 1977;
Quality of American Life, 1971; Canadian Quality of Life, 1977, 1979, 1981
(percent distributions)
Quality of Quality of Canadian Quality
Employment SurveyAmerican Life of Life
(Pooled)
Men Women Men Women MenWomen
CATEGORY
Strikingly beautiful 1.4 2.1 2.9 2.9 2.5 2.5
or handsome
Above average for 26.530.4 24.228.1 32.031.7
age (good looking)
Average for age 59.752.1 60.4 51.5 57.956.8
Below average for 11.413.7 10.8 15.2 7.2 8.3
age (quite plain)
Homely 1.0 1.7 1.7 2.3 0.4 0.7
N — 959 539 864 1194 38045464Table 3. The Impact of Looks on Employees' Earnings, QES 1977
(Dependent Variable is log(Hourly Earnings))e




Below average—.164 —.162 —.124 —.107






Above average .016 .010 .039 .035
(.033) (.034) (.048) (.049)
Good looking .011 .049
(.034) (.048)










.403 .403 .404 .330 .332 .327




Standard errors are in parentheses here and in Tables 4—7 and 9. The equations here
also include continuous and indicator variables measuring actual experience (and its
square), union membership, health status, marital status, race, years of vocational
school and region, and vectors of indicator variables for educational attainment,
tenure with the firm, firm size, city size and industry. The regressions exclude
observations for which data were not available to form these measures, and for which
weekly hours worked <20,hourly earnings <$1.and age >64or age <18.Table 4. The Impact of Looks on Employees' Earnings, QAL 1971
(Dependent Variable is log(1ourly Earnings))'




Below average —.078 —.138 —.079 .069 .122 .061






Above average .065 .109 .064 .128 .129 .118
(.045) (.052) (.045) (.056) (.076) (.056)
Good looking .072 .122
(.046) (.057)






Interviewer No YesNo No No YesNo No
Effects
.371.471 .370 .370 .283.332 .288 .293




'Also included are continuous and indicator variables measuring experience
(age —education—6)and its square, health status, race, marital status and
region, and vectors of indicator variables measuring educational attainment, city
size, immigrant Status of the individual, his or her parents and grandparents,
father's occupational status, and industry. The regressions exclude observations
for which data were not available to form these measures, and for which weekly hours
worked <20,hourly earnings < $75, and age >64or age <18.Table 5. The Impact of Looks on Employees' Earnings, Canadian QOL 1981
(Dependent Variable is log(Ronrl.y Earnings))'




Below average —.012 —.027 —.058 —.072
(.052) (.054) (.063) (.067)
Average
Above average .073 .059 .013 .010









Interviewer No Yes No No No Yes No No
Effects
R2 .302 .306 .285 .295 .394 .389 .410 .412
p on F—stati— .023 .099 .135 .012 .540 .492 .845 .320
stic for Beauty
Variables
N — 887 887 358358 883 883 335 335
'Also included are continuous and indicator variables measuring actual experience
and its square, health, union and marital status, and non—English speaker, and
vectors of indicator variables measuring educational attainment, tenure with the
firm, firm size, region and industry. The regressions exclude observations for
which data were unavailable to form these measures and for which weekly hours worked
<20,hourly earnings <$1,and age >64or age <18.Table 6. Pooled Estimatea of the Impact of Looks on Hourly Earnings
Penalty for Premium for p on p on Inter—
Below—average Above—average F—statistic sample Equality
Looks Looks for Beautyof Beauty Effects
Men:
All three samples —.091 .053 .0001 .246
(.031) (.019)
TwoU.S.samples —.132 .036 .0003 .443
(.039) (.027)
Women:
All three samples —.054 .038 .042 .163
(.038) (.022)




All three samples —.072 .048 .0001 .106
(.024) (.015)
Two U.S. samples —.092 .046 .0002 .051
(.031) (.022)Table 7. The Impact of Looks on Married Women's Labor-Force Participation. QAI.
1977, QOL 1981. and on Husband's Education, QES 1977
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




Below average—.168 —.310 —.468 —.510
(.176) (.153) (.239) (.232)
Average
Above average—.034 —.010 .014 —.001





Pseudo—R2 .148 .067 .084 .084 .183
N — 583 1287 621 621 199
1n the QAL the dependent variable equals one if the women was employed at the time
of the interview. In the QOL it is whether she stated she was in the labor force
on the interview date. Also included in the probits in both samples are continuous
and indicator variables measuring experience (and its square) and indicator
variables for educational attainment, health status, age and the presence and ages
of children of children. In the probits based on the QAL an indicator variable for
race is included, as is a measure of family income less the woman's income. In the
ordered probits husband's education is divided into four categories (less than 12
year, 12 years, 13 through 15, and 16 years and up), and his age and indicator
variables for the wife's educational attainment and health status are included.Table 8. Occupational Sorting: Percentage of Sample in Occupations with
Looks Important
Own Looks:





DOT 62.6 63.5 64.7 63.7 0.14 700
Subjective 13.2 13.3 11.1 12.7 0.65 700
Employer 46.5 52.2 44.3 49.3 2.14 428
Women
DOT 76.4 76.2 80.9 77.8 1.16 409
subjective 21.8 26.2 28.7 26.4 0.96 409
Employer 45.9 45.2 47.1 45.9 0.10 309
QAL
Men
DOT 40.0 55.6 64.5 56.9 9.00 476
Subjective 17.8 12.9 22.4 16.4 6.50 476
Employer 33.3 61.2 63.3 59.3 7.48 268
Women
DOT 67.4 73.9 81.1 75.6 3.61 307
Subjective 34.9 35.3 40.5 37.1 0.87 307
Employer 44.1 44.5 62.6 51.1 8.30 270
X.9(2)
—5.99
9(2) —4.60Table 9.Sorting, Looksandthe Determination of Earnings, QES, 1977, QAL 1971
(Dependent Variable is log(Rourly Earnings))
Looks: Below Below x Above Above x Occupation p on F—sta—
averageOccupationaverageOccupationindex tistic on
index index Main Effects
SAMPLEA}D OCCUPATIONAL INDEX
QES Men:
DOT —.177 —.036 .041 .072 .052.405 .002
(.058) (.095) (.042) (.069) (.041)
Subjective —.162 .007 .012 .051 .124 .405 .003
(.049) (.127) (.035) (.097) (072)
Employers—.187 —.112 —.095 .103 —.066 .410 .026
(.076) (.107) (.057) (.084) (049)
QES Women:
DOT —.174 —.218 .023 —.068 .032 .329 .036
(.075) (.157) (.054) (.119) (.085)
Subjective —.115 —.037 .050 —.036 .083 .326 .130
(.074) (.151) (.055) (.096) (.093)
Employers—.078 —.013 .152 —.312 .216 .315 .064
(.107) (.158> (.076) (.111) (.077)
QAL Men:
DOT —.102 —.057 .070 .011 .093.373.224
(.107) (.142) (.056) (.089) (.055)
Subjective —.097 .078 .045 .089 .085.371.223
(.076) (.177) (.048) (.099) (.102)
Employers .145 —.107 .124 —.072 —.006.213.449
(.150) (.250) (.121) (.152) (.095)
QAL. Women:
DOT .049 —.056 .166 .175 —.066.282.031
(.088) (.159) (.063) (.130) (.088)
Subjective.130 —.172 .075 .142 —.053.287.266
(.090) (.152) (.068) (.099) (.099)
Employers .253 —.304 .261 —.355 .218.272.058
(.153) (.229) (.127) (.162) (.117)
Each regression includes the same additional variables as in the corresponding
regression in Table 3 or 4.Thoseusing the occupational indexes based on the DOT
andsubjective measures also use the same samples.Those using the survey of
employers use smaller samples, N —428,309, 265 and 259.Appendix Table. Occupational Categories Taken from Employer Survey
MEN
Percentof Employers Cell Size
Saying Looks Very
Occupation or Somewhat Important
Precision Production 16.6 24
Machine Operators and Tenders 25.0 24
Protective Services 30.8 13
Construction 33.4 15
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners,
and Laborers cxc. Misc. 38.9 36
Cleaning and Building
Service Workers 40.0 15
Technologists and
Technicians, ax. Health 46.2 17
Administrative Support and Clerical
Occupations, cx. Mailroom
and Record Clerks 46.6 15
Mechanics and Helpers, cx. Auto. 46.9 32
Mailroom Workers, Record Clerks 47.1 17
Heavy Truck and Trailer Drivers 49.9 12
Drivers of Light Delivery Trucks,
Taxis, or Buses 55.0 20
Fabricators, Assemblers,
Hand Workers 60.2 15
Auto Mechanics 66.7 12
Food Preparation Occups. 66.7 12
Sales Occupations,
Commodities ex. Retail 70.0 10
Retail Sales Occupations 90.9 22Appendix Table, cont.
WOMEN
Registered Nurses, Phys. Assts. 18.2 11
Machine Operators and Tenders 22.2 18
Office Workers i: Information,
Correspondence,and Record Clerks;
Other Ceneral Office Occups ci.
Secretaries. Receptionists 37.1 37
Cleaning, Building Service Workers 38.9 18
Office Workers II: Office Machine
and Communications Operators;
Mailroom, Material Recording.
and other Misc. Clerks;
Adjusters and Investigators. 40.0 30
Office Workers III:
Financial Record Processing 42.3 26
Dental, Nursing, or Health Aides 42.9 14
Food Preparation Occups. 43.8 16
Teachers, K—12 57.1 14
Secretaries, Stenographers, Typists 59.6 52
Dental Hygienists, LPNs,
Misc. Health Technicians 61.1 18
Retail Sales and Counter Clerks 63.7 11
Bank Tellers 65.0 20
Retail Salespeople 65.2 23
Personal Service Occups.: Mostly
Cosmetologists, Ushers and Attendants 71.4 14
Cashiers 78.6 28
Receptionists 81.5
Waitresses and Food Counter Workers 81.8 22